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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-3228 
_____________ 
 
DALE W. THORPE; RENEE M. THORPE, 
   Appellants 
 
v. 
 
UPPER MAKEFIELD TOWNSHIP; UPPER MAKEFIELD TOWNSHIP BOARD OF 
SUPERVISORS; THOMAS F. CINO, CHAIRMAN; LARRY S. BREEDEN, VICE 
CHAIRMAN; MIKE TIERNEY; DAN RATTIGAN; MARY RYAN; DAVID A. 
KUHNS, UPPER MAKEFIELD TOWNSHIP DIRECTOR OF PLANNING & 
ZONING; JOHN C. KERNAN, UPPER MAKEFIELD FIRE MARSHALL 
   
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 2:14-cv-06154) 
District Judge: Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 1, 2018 
______________ 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, JORDAN, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: December 28, 2018) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellants Dale and Renee Thorpe appeal the District Court’s September 25, 
2017, order granting Appellees’ motion for summary judgment and dismissing the 
Thorpes’ Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection claims.  Their claims 
arise from numerous land use and zoning disputes with Upper Makefield Township (“the 
Township”).  The gist of the Thorpes’ claims is that they have been discriminated against 
on the basis of Dale Thorpe’s Native American race.   For the reasons that follow, we 
will affirm the District Court’s order.   
I.  
 In 2007, the Thorpes purchased Thorpe Farm from Dale’s cousins.  Seven years 
earlier, Dale’s cousins had entered into two conservation easement agreements with the 
Township, Bucks County, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.  Those agreements 
restrict the farm to agricultural uses and other specified uses in effect in 2000.  At all 
relevant times, Thorpe Farm was zoned CM-Conservation Management and subject to 
the Joint Municipal Zoning Ordinance (“JMZO”), which governs zoning in the Township 
and two neighboring municipalities.1  After purchasing the farm, the Thorpes told the 
Township’s Director of Planning and Zoning, Appellee David Kuhns,2 that they intended 
to expand the uses on the property.   
                                              
1 Wrightstown Township and Newtown Township are the other municipalities that 
are party to the JMZO, which has been in effect since 1983.   
 
 2 As the Township’s Director of Planning and Zoning, Kuhns is responsible for 
enforcing the Township’s zoning ordinances, including the JMZO. 
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 The Thorpes assert that this conversation with Kuhns led to a Township-wide 
campaign to “prevent [them] from obtaining the highest and best economic use of 
[Thorpe Farm].”  (Appellants’ Br. 4).  The Thorpes identified twenty-three zoning 
“enforcement actions” between 2007 and 2014, which they claim were initiated solely to 
harass and intimidate them.  (Id. at 6).  As the District Court noted, “[t]hese range from 
denials of permits to the issuance of enforcement notices and citations, to what [the 
Thorpes] describe as threats of legal action.”  (App. 4).   
 Some disputes arose from hazardous electrical wiring in the Thorpe Farm Store, 
the installation of neon signs, soil stockpiling, and other non-permitted uses of the farm 
by contractors.  Other zoning disputes stem from the Thorpes’ attempts to conduct new 
activities on the farm:  a deer processing business, tractor trailer storage, a timber harvest, 
commercial storage, a metal fabrication business, and a planned Halloween attraction in 
2011.  In all of these instances, the Township either ordered the Thorpes to cease the non-
permitted activity or refused to issue them a zoning permit to begin the activity.  In 
particular, Kuhns denied a permit application to hold a haunted house inside a barn on the 
farm because it was within 150 feet of a public road and would have required a zoning 
variance under a 2007 Amendment to the JMZO.3   
The Thorpes never pursued any of the zoning dispute remedial procedures 
available to them, such as appealing Kuhns’ zoning decisions to the Township Zoning 
                                              
3 The 2007 Amendment provides that “[n]o activity, event or structure used for an 
agricultural entertainment use shall be located within one hundred fifty (150) feet of a 
right-of-way line or residential property line . . . .” (App. 5 n.5). 
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Hearing Board.  Instead, they filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania alleging that they were discriminated against on the basis of 
race, in violation of their due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.4  After discovery, the defendants (at that point, the Township and Kuhns) 
moved for summary judgment, which the District Court granted.5  This appeal timely 
followed.     
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as Appellants’ 
claims arise under the United States Constitution.  We have appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s grant 
of summary judgment.  See, e.g., Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 
316 F.3d 431, 443 (3d Cir. 2003). 
III. 
 The Thorpes allege that Appellees violated their rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.  To survive a motion for 
summary judgment, a plaintiff must present concrete evidence in the record to prove that 
a genuine dispute of material fact exists.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. 
                                              
 4 The Thorpes also brought claims for abuse of process and intentional 
interference with contractual relations in violation of Pennsylvania common law.  Those 
claims were dismissed and are not at issue in this appeal.  
 
 5 The District Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 
Thorpes’ tortious interference claims and dismissed it without prejudice.  
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Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).  Here, the record lacks sufficient evidence for 
either of the Thorpes’ claims to survive summary judgment.   
A. 
 The Thorpes assert two violations of their substantive due process rights:  the 
Township’s general zoning enforcement and, more specifically, the Township’s adoption 
of the 150 foot set-back in the 2007 Amendment to the JMZO.6  To succeed on a 
substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must prove that he was deprived of a 
constitutionally protected liberty or property interest by arbitrary government action.  See 
United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 399 (3d Cir. 
2003) (citing Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-47 (1998)).  Constitutional 
arbitrariness is defined as egregious official conduct that “shocks the conscience.”  Lewis, 
523 U.S. at 846-47.  Using this “shocks the conscience” standard in the zoning context 
helps to ensure that courts are not “cast in the role of a ‘zoning board of appeals.’”  
United Artists, 316 F.3d at 402 (internal citations omitted).  We have held that conscience 
shocking behavior includes the deprivation of a liberty or property interest based on, inter 
alia, self-dealing, government corruption, or racial animus.  See Eichenlaub v. Twp. of 
Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 285-86 (3d Cir. 2004).  However, without more, unfair 
enforcement of zoning ordinances is not conscience shocking behavior.  Id.   
                                              
6 At the District Court, the Thorpes also challenged the Township’s enforcement 
of the set-back provision against them.  However, we decline to address this argument as 
they have not raised that challenge on appeal. 
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 Here, the Thorpes contend that the Township deprived them of the best use of 
their land.  Cases involving zoning permits or the enforcement of zoning ordinances 
implicate the constitutionally protected property interest in land ownership.  See Indep. 
Enters. Inc. v. Pittsburgh Water & Sewer Auth., 103 F.3d 1165, 1179 n.12 (3d Cir. 1997).  
Thus, we must determine whether the allegedly unfair zoning enforcement shocks the 
conscience such that it rises to the level of a constitutional violation.   
 The Thorpes assert that the Township’s unfair zoning enforcement shocks the 
conscience because it was motivated by racial animus toward Native Americans.  Race-
based discriminatory enforcement of zoning ordinances would certainly constitute 
conscience shocking behavior.  See Holder v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 197 (3d 
Cir. 1993).  The Thorpes assert two pieces of evidence to support their allegation of racial 
animus.  First, they cite Dale Thorpe’s own testimony that “somebody complained about 
the Native American drumming and one neighbor walking one day made a comment to 
[him] that it just takes one bad Indian.”  (App. 296).  Second, the Thorpes cite an incident 
in which Kuhns met with their African-American contractor at the Township Building.  
While it is unclear what transpired at this meeting, the police were called and they 
completed a police report listing the contractor’s race as “black.”  (App. 11 n.25).    
 This evidence proffered by the Thorpes is insufficient proof of racial animus.  
There is no evidence that the complaint about drumming led to any zoning enforcement 
action by the Township, and a comment by a neighbor cannot rationally be attributed to 
the Township or to Kuhns.  Further, with respect to the police incident, we agree with the 
District Court’s finding that, albeit strange, this incident is not sufficient evidence to 
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support the Thorpes’ claim that Kuhns has a general racial bias, and is therefore biased 
against Native Americans.   
 Nor have the Thorpes offered evidence of any other allegedly conscience-shocking 
behavior.  To the contrary, the record shows that the Township’s zoning enforcement 
actions amount to nothing more than typical municipal land-use disputes.   
 The Thorpes also claim that the Township violated their substantive due process 
rights because the Township had no rational basis to adopt the 2007 Amendment to the 
JMZO, particularly its set-back provision.  We disagree.  The Thorpes bear the burden of 
proving that there was no rational basis for enacting the Amendment.  To meet that 
burden, the Thorpes allege that the Amendment was enacted solely “to affect [them] 
because [they were] told the [T]ownship had other plans for the property and [the 
Township was] going to make it too hard for [the Thorpes] to afford to stay there . . . .”  
(App. 342).  However, the record shows that the Amendment was adopted by all three 
municipalities subject to the JMZO and contained numerous provisions that applied to 
general commercial agricultural land uses.  It was proposed in 2006, before the Thorpes 
even owned Thorpe Farm.    Further, the Thorpes concede that the Township is generally 
concerned about commercial activity and traffic, particularly relating to Halloween 
attractions.  (App. 15).  These are sufficient rational bases for the enactment of the 
Amendment.   
 We agree with the District Court that no reasonable jury could conclude that the 
Township lacked a rational basis to enact the Amendment or that it was enacted to spite 
the Thorpes.  The Thorpes have failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact 
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regarding their due process claims.  Accordingly, we hold that the District Court properly 
granted summary judgment on these claims.       
B. 
 The Thorpes also allege a violation of their equal protection rights.  We have 
previously declared that it is “very unlikely that a claim that fails the substantive due 
process test will survive under an equal protection approach.”  Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at 
287.  We will review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for the Appellees 
on the Thorpe’s equal protection claim under two theories:  (1) a selective enforcement 
theory and (2) a “class of one” theory.  See id. at 286. 
A selective enforcement claim is based on the well-established principle that 
discriminatory enforcement of a facially neutral law violates the Equal Protection Clause.  
Holder, 987 F.2d at 197 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886)).  To 
succeed on a selective enforcement claim, a party must prove that he was treated 
differently than similarly situated individuals and that the selective treatment was based 
on “‘an unjustifiable standard, such as race, or religion, or some other arbitrary 
factor . . . .’”  Id.  (quoting United States v. Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1989)).  
The Thorpes contend that, unlike the owners of similarly situated farms, they were 
subject to increased zoning scrutiny because Dale Thorpe is Native American.  
Assuming, arguendo, that the Thorpes were in fact treated differently, there is no 
evidence that race was the impetus for the different treatment.  That is, nothing in the 
record suggests any nexus between Dale Thorpe’s Native American race and the 
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Township’s zoning enforcement actions.  Thus, the Thorpe’s equal protection claim must 
fail under a selective enforcement theory.   
 Under a “class of one” equal protection claim, a party must prove that he was 
“intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no 
rational basis for the difference in treatment.”  Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 
225, 239 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) 
(per curiam) (holding that a class of one could challenge different treatment under the 
Equal Protection Clause where treatment was alleged to be “irrational and wholly 
arbitrary”)).  The Thorpes contend that they are similarly situated to the owners of several 
other CM-zoned farms—Ely Farm, Tierney Farm, Gunser Farm, and Slack Farm—who 
received more favorable zoning enforcement decisions, for no rational reason.  However, 
the record shows that, just like the Thorpes, these other farm owners had various zoning 
disputes with the Township.  In contrast to the Thorpes, the owners of the other farms 
took advantage of the remedial procedures afforded to them, such as appealing adverse 
decisions to the Township Zoning Hearing Board or seeking zoning variances.7  The 
Thorpes, however, failed to avail themselves of these remedial procedures.   
                                              
 7 The following are examples of zoning issues between the Township and owners 
of the other CM-zoned farms, as noted by the District Court, see App. 6-7: 
 
1. The Elys appealed Kuhns’ denial of a zoning permit for a farm store.  They obtained a 
variance, which allowed them to operate the store provided that they comply with certain 
conditions, such as installing a fire suppression system and planting trees and bushes to 
hide propane tanks and solar panels.   
 
2.  Kuhns denied Michael Tierney’s zoning application to build a pole barn because it 
violated a set-back ordinance.  He also denied Tierney’s application to build a layer 
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 Although the record shows that the Thorpes may have had more zoning disputes 
than the other farm owners, the increased frequency of zoning enforcement actions alone 
is not enough to demonstrate that the Township treated the Thorpes less favorably than 
the similarly situated farm owners.  Moreover, the fact that the owners of the other CM-
zoned farms applied for zoning permits, appealed permit denials, and sought zoning 
variances proves that they, too, were subjected to similar zoning enforcement as were the 
Thorpes.  The difference is that, unlike the Thorpes, these farm owners appealed adverse 
zoning decisions and sometimes prevailed in obtaining permits for new land uses.  Thus, 
we agree with the District Court that any ultimate difference in zoning treatment was 
supported by legitimate, rational reasons, including differences in the activities conducted 
on the farms, requests for zoning variances, and the outcome of zoning appeals.    
 In sum, the Thorpes have failed to show a genuine issue of material fact regarding 
their equal protection claim.  Accordingly, we agree with the District Court’s award of 
summary judgment on this claim.    
                                              
house for his chickens.  Tierney successfully appealed these decisions to the Township 
Zoning Hearing Board and was forced to get a mercantile license for his farm store.  
 
3.  Kuhns denied the Gunsers’ application for a hayride, corn maze, and live Halloween 
entertainment.  The Gunsers appealed to the Township Zoning Hearing Board, which 
granted a variance for the Halloween event, with no amplified entertainment.  They also 
appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County, which allowed them to have 
live, amplified entertainment.  The Township inspects the Halloween attraction every 
year and once refused to authorize a haunted house attraction until a fire suppression 
system was installed.   
 
4. The Slacks applied for a permit from Kuhns prior to displaying a directional sign to 
advertise their Milk House Farm Market.   
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IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order.     
 
